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If we confine the idea of ownership to owners of private property,
we constrict the relationship between individuals and a society’s resources and suggest that owners of private property have special
status, in terms of their control over, and connections with, resources that separate them from other individuals.1

I.

INTRODUCTION

Property rights have long been recognized as one of the primary
means of resolving commons dilemmas,2 and indeed property rights
often offer elegant solutions to natural resource management challenges. Yet, property rights unconstrained by inputs representing the
public interest may also do nothing more than replicate the traditional
commons dynamic, at least as it relates to the protection of environmental resources. We may tend to conceive of natural resources (or
“natural capital”) on private property as no longer in a commons con† Burlington Resources Professor in Environmental Law and Edward J. Womac,
Jr. Professor in Energy Law, LSU Law Center and LSU School of the Coast and
Environment. I would like to thank Timothy Mulvaney for organizing the symposium
and for including me in it. I thank Peter Gerhart for undertaking this work and allowing me and others to comment on it. I also thank my fellow panelists for their
insights into the book and contributions to this symposium. Finally, I thank the staff
of the Texas A&M Journal of Real Property Law for their hard work on improving
this article.
1. PETER M. GERHART, PROPERTY LAW AND SOCIAL MORALITY 312 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2013).
2. See Garrett Hardin, Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968), available
at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1724745.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/JPL.V2.I2.4
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dition, and therefore no longer as prone to tragic over-appropriation
by resource users. Yet, the only resource within a property boundary
that is no longer in a commons state is the land base itself. While the
land base is depletable—one of the two defining elements of commons resources—property boundaries eliminate the second element,
non-excludability.3 Indeed, the right to exclude others from one’s
property, as highlighted in Peter Gerhart’s book, Property Law and
Social Morality,4 is a defining indicia of property ownership. Recent
theory assessing the nature of natural capital on private land,5 however, demonstrates that notwithstanding privatization of the land
base, the natural capital present on private land remains in a commons status, and is just as subject to tragic overuse and overconsumption as the pastoral resources described in Hardin’s Tragedy of the
Commons.6 As with Hardin’s grass, these resources also remain just
as crucial to the well-being of the broader community, which we might
describe as “the public.” In this way, we can describe natural capital
on private land as “privatized commons resources.”7
Why does this theoretical description of natural resources on private land matter? As detailed in this Article, the description matters
primarily because it allows greater public control over private resource use—control unfettered by complications presented by legal
theories like the regulatory takings doctrine. Gerhart’s theory provides a critical element to making privatized commons resource theory legally defensible. To legally demonstrate that property owners
maintain no baseline unfettered right to appropriate natural capital as
they please, it is first necessary to demonstrate that they maintain a
legal duty or obligation. If they maintain such a legal obligation, then
society, in turn, is under no legal obligation to compensate property
owners for limitations on their ability to consume (or “appropriate”)
natural capital on their land.
Critics of privatized commons resource theory might argue that the
legal right to exclude others includes not only physical exclusion from
3. On the elements of depletability and non-excludability, see Robert O. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom, Introduction to LOCAL COMMONS AND GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE 1, 13 (Robert O. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom eds., 1995); Oran R. Young, The
Problem of Scale in Human/Environment Relationships, in LOCAL COMMONS AND
GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE 27, 29 (Robert O. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom eds., 1995);
Duncan Snidal, The Politics of Scope: Endogenous Actors, Heterogeneity and Institutions, in LOCAL COMMONS AND GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE 47, 50 (Robert O. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom eds., 1995); Steven Hackett, Dean Dudley & James Walker,
Heterogeneities, Information and Conflict Resolution: Experimental Evidence on
Sharing Contracts, in LOCAL COMMONS AND GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE 93, 95
(Robert O. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom eds., 1995).
4. GERHART, supra note 1.
5. Blake Hudson, Constitutions and the Commons: The Impact of Federal Governance on Local, National, and Global Resource Management (2014).
6. Hardin, supra note 2, at 1245.
7. Blake Hudson, Commerce in the Commons: A Unified Theory of Natural Capital Regulation Under the Commerce Clause, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 375, 377 (2011).
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one’s land but also exclusion from decisions regarding the appropriation of natural capital on one’s land. This criticism would posit that
“true” commoners, on the other hand, do not maintain a legal right to
exclude others from appropriating natural capital that they might otherwise appropriate (nor any corresponding obligations), and this is
why they are unable to leverage any rights to negotiate solutions to
commons tragedies. Gerhart’s theory fills this gap by demonstrating
that just like “true” commoners, when left to their own devices private
property owners are under no compulsion to preserve the resources
on their property, and therefore may not be excluded from doing so
unless they voluntarily constrain themselves (through private contract) or are constrained by an external entity (in the form of the government). However, property owners do not maintain a baseline right
to exclude others from decision-making regarding their appropriation
(or consumption) of natural capital. This right does not exist because,
as per Gerhart’s theory, owners maintain a moral duty—which may
manifest through positive law—to use the resources on their property
in an other-regarding manner. In turn, society should utilize the veil
of ignorance to determine exactly what those duties are so that it can
codify them in positive law. In this context the veil of ignorance
would ask: how might objective property owners today want resources
to be managed if they did not know when they might be born, now or
far into the future?8 The answer to that question defines the scope of
property owner obligations. In this way, natural capital on private
land remains depletable, non-excludable commons resources, and the
state therefore may become a necessary party to its management in
the absence of coordinated, altruistic action on the part of property
owners or a holistic scheme of successful private contractual arrangements.9 In addition, because a duty may be imposed on property owners by the state, arising out of this manifestation of moral notions of
the appropriate distribution of benefits and burdens of property ownership and resource use, restricted use of the resources on one’s property cannot give rise to claims of just compensation under the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. As Gerhart
claims, this constitutional limitation should only apply when the state
restricts in some way a property owner’s right to exclude others from
the land base (or their portion of it).
This Article makes a simple and hopefully straightforward attempt
to demonstrate how Gerhart’s property theory fills the gaps in privatized commons resource theory. Part II describes in more detail
privatized commons resource theory, while Part III discusses Ger8. James Rasband, James Salzman, and Mark Squillace, Natural Resources Law
and Policy 20 (2009).
9. See Blake Hudson & Jonathan Rosenbloom, Uncommon Approaches to Commons Problems: Nested Governance Commons and Climate Change, 64 HASTINGS L.J.
1273, 1274–75 (2013).
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hart’s theory both generally and more specifically in the context of
natural resources management. This Part first analyzes Gerhart’s explicit grappling with the commons broadly, and more directly wrestles
with how his theory lays a legal framework for addressing temporal
commons and the interests of future generations in natural capital.
Next, this Part discusses the role of positive public law in manifesting
society’s moral choice regarding natural capital appropriation. Finally, this Part addresses the weaknesses of traditional law and economics analysis, as highlighted in both privatized commons resource
theory and Gerhart’s theory, and how it does not adequately account
for society’s interest in natural capital. Part IV concludes.
II.

PRIVATIZED COMMONS RESOURCE THEORY

Recent scholarship has re-conceptualized natural resources present
on private and public land as remaining commons resources overlaid
by a property rights system.10 This reconceptualization is important
for two reasons. First, as a policy matter it symbolizes that resources
on private land are just as at risk of tragic overuse as they would be in
a traditional common-pool resource system. Second, it demonstrates
as a legal matter that the public maintains interests in private property
owners’ use of resources that ultimately trumps private property interests if positive law restricts those uses—resources on any one private
property owner’s land remain in a common-pool shared with the public (including future generations).
As noted in the Introduction, while the land base is no longer a
common-pool commons resource11 once privatized, the natural capital
on that land constitutes depletable resource units12 of natural capital
often appropriated by individually rational private property owners
from the resource system13 that is the collection of private properties
constituting the “environment.” This conceptualization therefore satisfies the depletability prong of the test for determining whether resources are considered of a commons nature. The non-excludability
element is also satisfied because no private property owner can be
excluded from appropriating the resource unit of natural capital over
which she maintains control in the absence of either horizontal, voluntary contractual agreements with neighboring property owners or vertical government regulation. As commons scholars have noted,
commons resources are “subtractable resources managed under a
10. Hudson, supra note 5.
11. See GERHART, supra note 1, at ix–xi (a common-pool resource is to be distinguished from open access. Open access signifies unlimited entry, but common-pool
resources are accessed by a limited set of users, in this case a particular group of
property owners).
12. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 30 (James E. Alt & Douglass C. North, eds., 1990).
13. Id.
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property regime in which a legally defined user pool cannot be efficiently excluded from the resource domain.”14 Without mechanisms
of exclusion in place, private property owners may seek to rationally15
maximize short-term economic interest—often through the clearing of
natural capital for development—while the long-term cost to the environment is spread across the public at large (again, including future
generations). We can see these aggregated effects in the urban sprawl
that has increasingly fragmented habitat and contributed to air and
water quality problems across much of the United States.
I will not delve too deeply into the relevant commons literature in
this Article, as it is covered in depth elsewhere. But the way in which
key terminology—like “resource unit,” “resource system,” “appropriators,” “co-appropriators” and other terms16—are defined in the commons literature supports privatized commons resource theory.
Critically, if we define one resource unit of natural capital with reference to one set of private (or government) property boundaries, and
the resource system as the broader environment made up of a collection of private and public properties, then private property owners are
no different from traditional commons herders. In a traditional common-pool resource system an individual herder can exclude others
from “resource units,” just as a private property owner can exclude
others from coming onto his or her property. What a herder cannot
exclude are other herders from extracting other resource units of natural capital from the resource system. Both the pasture and the natural capital on private land remain constituent components of a
commons resource system. Ostrom makes this clear when she states
that though a resource system can be jointly held and multiple appropriators can appropriate resource units from the system, the resource
units themselves “are not subject to joint use or appropriation.”17
Consider a thought experiment involving landowners X and Y, whose
private properties are adjacent to each other. Both X and Y control a
resource unit of natural capital defined by his or her respective property boundaries. These resources are depletable and the natural capital within the resource system—that is, across the collection of private
14. SUSAN J. BUCK, THE GLOBAL COMMONS: AN INTRODUCTION 5 (1998). As
Carol Rose has pointed out:
Indeed a private property regime itself—whether governmental or customary—may be understood as a managed ‘commons’—a meta-property held in
common by those who understand and follow its precepts. In a sense, a
movement toward private property is a movement from a ‘commons’ in a
physical resource to a ‘commons’ in the social structure of individualized resource management.
Carol Rose, Comedy of the Commons, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 746-47 (1986) (emphasis added).
15. Blake Hudson, Federal Constitutions: The Keystone of Nested Commons Governance, 63 ALA. L. REV. 1007, 1010 n. 6 (2012).
16. OSTROM, supra note 12, at 30–41.
17. Id. at 31.
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properties—is non-excludable. The question of non-excludability
does not mean that X cannot exclude Y from X’s property or vice
versa. Rather, the question from the perspective of others within the
resource system (other property owners and the public) is how difficult, if not impossible it is to exclude X or Y from appropriating the
one resource unit of natural capital over which they maintain control
absent external controls. In this way:
Just as two herders cannot occupy the same spot in the pasture,
nor can their cattle graze the exact same blades of grass, no two
private property owners’ parcels of land can occupy the same spot,
nor can their bulldozers remove the same natural capital. Herders
may move around in the pasture, just as X and Y may legally swap
properties an infinite number of times. Or herders may remain stationary and increase their herd until their herds merge, just as private property owners may remain stationary until a Walmart
parking lot abuts a Best Buy parking lot. In each case, however, the
pasture and private lands from which the resource units of natural
capital are appropriated remain a part of a system that is a natural
capital commons. It is equally impossible to exclude herders or private property owners from appropriating the natural capital resource units available to them in their current position in both space
and time.18

As this thought experiment demonstrates, and as Ostrom observed,
the primary contribution of a private property rights system to natural
capital management is to pit each property owner “against nature in a
smaller terrain, rather than . . . against another player in larger terrain.”19 Indeed, justifications for private property as a means for solving commons dilemmas often reference property’s role in
safeguarding an owner’s assets.20 Yet what is lost in that analysis is
that property largely plays this safeguard role only in an economic
sense. Property rights in land does not inherently entail safeguarding
environmental resources or services on the property that may, of
course, be of interest to the individual property owner,21 but that are
most certainly of interest, in the aggregate, to the broader public. A
party may own 100 acres of pristine forest that provides flood control,
water retention, air quality, species habitat, and other ecosystem services,22 and yet the property owner may develop the entire acreage
18. Hudson, supra note 15, at 1045.
19. OSTROM, supra note 12, at 12.
20. Rasband, supra note 8, at 70.
21. Of course private property can be used to protect natural resources just as it
may be used to destroy it. The benefit of strong property rights protections is if someone wants to leave all of the natural capital on their property untouched they have a
legally protected right to do so. Though even this is not absolute. Some property regimes, such as the prior appropriation system in the west, actually punish property
owners for not consuming the resource.
22. See Ecosystem Services, USDA FOREST SERV. (Oct. 1, 2013 9:48 AM), http://
www.fs.fed.us/ecosystemservices/.
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into a strip mall and an associated parking lot. The property owner’s
assets are safeguarded, but the natural capital is gone and so too are
the public’s assets in the form of ecosystem services.23 The complete
replacement of natural capital with human-made capital in an effort to
rationally maximize economic interests provides the developer here
with a 100 percent return for her use of the property, but she only
suffers a fraction of the negative cost imposed by impervious surfaces,
the heat island effect, increased flooding, loss of habitat, and loss of
carbon sequestration capabilities, to name only a few harms. Those
costs are spread across the collection of private and public properties
in the region, and are further spread temporally since those costs are
foisted on future generations. These are the attributes of a commons.
Indeed, property owners are often incentivized to maximize economic returns by engaging in just this type of land use transition, as
metrics of economic well-being are tied heavily to land use development that appropriates natural capital.24 So while we tend to conceive
of the traditional commons story as starting with a pasture unbounded
by property lines and open to herders with equal access, we rarely
ever ask how Hardin’s rational herder came to have pasturelands in
the first place. Upon making this inquiry we might conclude (as described in another thought experiment):
Perhaps a private property rights system was already in place and
the rational herder simply bought the property from a rational forester, who had managed the land for forest products until a shift in
the market simultaneously caused the forest products industry to
move overseas and agricultural products like grass and sheep to become more valuable. Thus the rational herder came to own the
property by paying the rational forester a nice sum . . . and then
converted the property from forest land to agricultural land with a
plentitude of grass resources. Though grass resources remained, the
trees were gone, and gone too were the services they provided and
other resources present in the forest. Though an individual herder
or forester can legally exclude others from accessing his or her property, no individual herder, forester, or other property owner can, in
the absence of government regulation . . . be excluded from either
appropriating the natural capital on one’s property or from selling it
to another who will. So even though the forester’s trees were
23. While some may argue that public restrictions on the right of a property owner
to so appropriate those resources eviscerates the “safeguarding of assets” role of private property, it is seems clear that private property owners maintain no legal entitlement to hold resources crucial to public well-being hostage under a private property
regime—especially when there are sound arguments that the property regime is ultimately focused on protecting a property owner’s right to exclude, as articulated by
Gerhart, rather than a right to use natural resources. Furthermore, restrictions on an
owner’s use of property need not restrict all use, but rather may attach conditions to
use such that a property owner must set aside certain acreage to preserve resources
and services, rather than develop the entire property.
24. Hudson, supra note 15, at 1039–41.
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fenced in and privatized, as was the subsequent herder’s pasture, a
“tragedy” is likely to occur at each step in the chain of ownership
regarding various important natural resources—even in the presence of a private property rights system.25

Next, consider a later step in the chain of ownership:
Assume that a herder with privatized pasture lands is approached
by a rational grocer, who wants to develop a market to sell various
agricultural products for human consumption. Because market demand for grocery products is high, the grocer is able to offer the
herder an attractive sum of money for the land . . . As a result,
incentives are aligned for an increasing number of herders to sell
their pasture lands to an increasing number of grocers. Once the
grocers obtain a private property interest in the pasture lands it is
difficult to exclude their appropriation of depletable natural capital
in the absence of government intervention or internal arrangements
among grocers. What becomes of the grass? In establishing their
places of business, the grocers rid the land of the grass, construct
their markets, and pave the property to allow customer parking.
Not only is the grass gone, but ambient temperatures in the region
rise due to the urban heat island effect, impervious surfaces on the
property lead to pollution and greater risk of flooding downstream,
the population’s water supply is potentially reduced as groundwater
aquifer recharge is slowed, and carbon sequestration capabilities are
eliminated, to name a few environmental harms. In other words,
the grocers’ complete replacement of natural capital with humanmade capital in an effort to rationally maximize their economic interests provides them with a 100 percent return for their use of the
property, but they only suffer a fraction of the negative cost imposed by impervious surfaces, the heat island effect, increased
flooding, and loss of carbon sequestration capabilities. Those costs
are spread across the collection of private properties in the region.26

These thought experiments demonstrate how similar private property owners operate relative to the traditionally conceived commons
herder. Yet, though the resources remain in a common-pool condition, a manifestation of the broader public’s interest in how those resources are being managed, the rights associated with utilization of
resources on land are often viewed synonymously with the property
rights attaching to the land itself. This conflation of property rights in
resources and rights in land is especially prevalent among property
rights advocates who resist virtually any governmental limits on resource use for the supposed benefit of the public.27 So in this view,
25. Hudson, supra note 7, at 391.
26. Hudson, supra note 15, at 1043–44.
27. JOHN D. ECHEVERRIA, PROPERTY VALUES AND OREGON MEASURE 37: EXPOSING THE FALSE PREMISE OF REGULATION’S HARM TO LANDOWNERS 4 (Georgetown Envtl. Law & Policy Inst. 2007), available at http://www.gelpi.org/gelpi/
current_research/documents/GELPIMeasure37Report.pdf (considering Oregon’s referendum Measure 37, which required either compensation for the adverse economic
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restricting a property owner’s ability to destroy a unique ecological
habitat to develop a condominium on a piece of coastal property is
equivalent to restricting access to the land or forbidding a property
owner from excluding others from the land,28 the latter two actions
being sacred indicia of land ownership (the right to access and the
right to exclude). The rationale underpinning the regulatory takings
doctrine exemplifies this view29—that is, regulations that (supposedly)
wipe out all economic value of a piece of property30 or overly burden
the investment-backed expectations of property owners to benefit the
public31 are often characterized as the functional equivalents of eminent domain and the physical taking of property.32
A conflation of rights in land and rights in resources, however, cannot be reconciled with the modified property regimes that have arisen
regarding many resources characterized as fugitive, and therefore
more readily recognized as common-pool resources. Consider oil and
gas, water (including groundwater), wildlife, and fisheries, to name
only a few examples. These resources move, and this motility is a very
visible manifestation of their fungibility. This fungibility, in turn,
means that one property owner’s use of the resource necessarily implicates the rights of others to have access to and potentially use those
resources in the future. While these resources may be “captured,”33
property rights in the resources are constrained by duties owed to
others (correlative rights in water and oil and gas,34 preventing overexploitation of wildlife through the wildlife trust doctrine,35 the duty
not to negligently waste oil and gas when captured at the surface36).
These constraints make property rights in these resources readily subject to public controls without any obligations under a just compensation regime, unlike a number of other property rights, such as the
right to exclude others from land, the right to sell, the right to transfer
property to descendants, and so on. Of course, the right to use land—
effects of regulations or a government waiver of enforcement of the regulations. A
study of the effects of Measure 37 found that in virtually every instance of a claim of
diminution of property value due to regulation, the government granted a waiver);
but cf. MEASURE 49 GUIDE, (Dep’t of Land, Conservation, & Dev. 2008) available at
http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/MEASURE49/docs/general/m49_guide.pdf (showing
Measure 37 has since been significantly limited in application by Measure 49).
28. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1008–17 (1992).
29. WILLIAM MICHAEL TREANOR, THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE, 5 (Georgetown Envtl. Law & Policy Inst. 1998), available at http://
scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi_papers/2/.
30. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
31. See Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
32. GERHART, supra note 1.
33. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BARTON THOMPSON, PROPERTY LAW: OWNERSHIP,
USE, AND CONSERVATION 234 (1st ed. 2006).
34. See id. at 240, 263.
35. See Blake Hudson, The Public and Wildlife Trust Doctrines and the Untold
Story of the Lucas Remand, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 99, 111–12 (2009).
36. GOLDSTEIN & THOMPSON, supra note 33, at 235–42.
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which includes the right to utilize resources upon it—is one stick in
this bundle of property rights. Even so, rights in the use of land have
never been absolute, as evidenced by common law doctrines like nuisance. Similarly, for the foregoing reasons, rights to use the land itself
may be limited in circumstances where doing so would unreasonably
harm the public’s interest in the natural capital that may be displaced
through that use. In short, unrestricted utilization of resources on
land has never been a guaranteed aspect of ownership. To place it on
par with the right to physically exclude, in our understandings of takings jurisprudence or otherwise, is simply an intellectual misstep.
Indeed, we are beginning to understand that resources anchored to
the land are no less fungible simply because they lack motility. Take
wetlands, for example; the wetlands themselves may be anchored to
specific parcels of property, but it is the interface with fugitive resources (water) that defines the value of wetland resources to society.
This interface often stretches across numerous properties in one continuous whole, regardless of the fact that many landowners’ property
lines may bisect the wetland. And even when wetlands do not stretch
across properties and are otherwise considered “isolated,”37 their role
in the hydrologic cycle implicates surrounding properties. Other resources, like forests, also may be viewed as fungible or “fugitive”
given new understandings of their functionality. For example, if one
characterizes forest resources as providing building materials, paper
products, energy resources in the form of biofuel, and energy cost savings for households and businesses, then their anchoring to individual
properties might be viewed as supporting the same property rules that
run with the land itself. But when we understand forest resources to
also provide clean air services that filter and trap air pollutants; clean
water services that prevent nutrient, chemical, and other non-point
pollution from entering waterways; protection of fisheries through
mitigating run-off pollution and regulating stream temperatures; flood
control services; residential energy savings; important habitat for diverse species; regulation of local ambient air temperatures in urban
and rural areas; aesthetic, spiritual, cultural, and recreational values;
and—perhaps most importantly—a global carbon sink that regulates
climate, then forests are no less fungible than water, oil and gas, or
wildlife. The interface between forests and fugitive water, air, and biodiversity, render forest resources traditionally considered the proprietary interest of the property owner very much a public, common-pool
resource when aggregated across private properties.
While the fugitive nature of some resources, like air and surface
water, may cause us to consider these resources less subject to privatization than others, we also tend to (mistakenly) think of true com37. Blake Hudson and Michael Hardig, Isolated Wetland Commons and the Constitution, 2015 BYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).
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mons resources as subject to appropriators that are mobile. The
herders in the commons fable, after all, roam around on Hardin’s pasture as they graze their cattle. This is why we often hear the refrain
that a prototypical commons in modern times is an ocean fishery. It is
true that a private property owner cannot move the use of his or her
property around the surrounding environment comprised of other private properties (e.g., the commons). But we have other examples of
commons appropriators that are quite stationary. Consider the users
of groundwater aquifers, which are widely considered another prototypical commons resource. The parties withdrawing water from the
aquifer are anchored to the surface and engage in their extraction activities within defined property boundaries (and indeed are most often
restricted to using that water only on that property38). Although the
appropriators are not mobile, their unchecked, rational consumption
of the resource may lead to its degradation and destruction. Thus,
society has established modified property regimes to allocate rights in
groundwater resources.
Groundwater aquifers-as-a-commons indicate that it is not the mobility of the appropriator that makes a commons, but rather the intensity of “co-appropriators”39 unchecked use of the resources making up
the commons—co-appropriators who may very well be anchored to
particular parcels of property, just as private forest owners may appropriate forest resources above the surface. Each of Hardin’s herders,
after all, could stand immobile in one spot of the pasture, but continue
adding cattle until eventually one herder’s cattle merge with the cattle
of another herder standing a good distance away. It is the increased
intensity of use by the addition of more cattle that drives the resource
tragedy. This is the same mechanism by which private property owners may remain stationary while still appropriating natural capital with
increasing intensity in an unchecked fashion. This element of property ownership is often overlooked in property theory. For example,
Gerhart highlighted Demsetz’s view that creating private property
rights reduces the overuse associated with common access regimes.40
Demsetz view, however, does not account for changes in the intensity
of use of land that removes one resource to make room for another
use, the latter of which may simply be a feat of human engineering
that leaves little natural capital in place, such as a parking lot and big
box retailer.
Ultimately, property rights in natural resources anchored to land
can be distinguished from rights in the ownership and use of the land
base itself, primarily based upon their non-stationary, fugitive function in providing services to society. In this way we can conceive of
privatized commons resources as remaining in a commons condition:
38. GOLDSTEIN & THOMPSON, supra note 33, at 263.
39. OSTROM, supra note 12, at 12.
40. GERHART, supra note 1, at 97.
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the broader society, represented by other property owners and nonowners, maintains a vested interest in the resource over which any
single property owner maintains control. That property owner, in
turn, may appropriate those resources to the detriment of the aggregated collection of private property owners unless constrained from
doing so.
So in summary, we have two ways of looking at resources on private
land: (1) as common-pool commons resources in which the public has
a legal interest due to the corollary legal duty of the property owner to
utilize resources in an other-regarding, moral manner or (2) as subject
to unrestricted control by the property owner, who must be compensated if and when restrictions do emerge. But even the most ardent
property advocate would admit that unrestricted utilization of resources subject to private control and ownership has never been a part
of their bundle of sticks—hence a reasonable use rule for groundwater resources, nuisance law, and many other traditional restrictions
on landowners’ ability to use resources. So, admitting that there is no
absolute right to unrestricted use of resources, it is unclear how property owners can claim that absolute restrictions on use of certain resources are legally deficient and warrant just compensation under
regulatory takings analysis.41
Viewing natural capital on private lands as common-pool assists us
in separating analysis of property rights in natural capital from the
relatively unassailable property rights to exclude, to access, to transfer, and to bequeath the land upon which natural capital is situated.
By re-conceptualizing the state of rights in natural capital as tracking a
commons, rather than as a private resource whereby otherwise tragic
externalities are now magically internalized, we can see from a policy
perspective that the tragic plight of resources remains, only in a different form. As a result, society should be more serious about ensuring
the public’s interests in those resources are captured, through positive
law or otherwise. Property rights are supposedly a means of resolving
commons dilemmas, and should not be exacerbating them by institutionalizing the commons dynamic. In addition to this policy point,
privatized commons resource theory demonstrates as a legal matter
that the public maintains interests in a private property owners’ use of
resources that ultimately trumps private property interests if positive
law manifests restricting those uses. This is because, as detailed in the
next Section, property owners maintain a legal duty, arising out of
social moral norms allocating the benefits and burdens of ownership,
to be other-regarding in the management of natural resources.

41. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992).
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PROPERTY LAW, SOCIAL MORALITY, AND PRIVATIZED
COMMONS RESOURCE THEORY

A system of property law is a statement about what a society values when it must choose between various ways of shaping systems
for making decisions about resources.42

Peter Gerhart’s book, Property Law and Social Morality, makes a
number of important and unique contributions to property theory,
helping us to better understand when property rights arise and to determine the scope of those rights. Gerhart defines private property as
“dominion over a resource that is constrained by the obligation to act
as one would if the decisions about the resource appropriately assigned the burdens and benefits of resource use.”43 The purpose of
property law, according to Gerhart, is not to address “relationships
between individuals over things,” but rather to provide a framework
for individuals to work out “an appropriate assignment of the burdens
and benefits of decisions about a resource.”44
Seeking to break the entrenched view that property owners and
non-owners have conflicting interests, Gerhart seeks a theory of property law where the same set of values that gives rise to property rights
also limits those rights.45 Gerhart characterizes his theory as establishing, for example, a single point of origin, based on social values,
for both the right to exclude and limitations on that right. Similarly, in
the context of common law nuisance the obligation to be neighborly
arises because “the values that allow one to be free from interference
by a neighbor are the same values that restrict an owner’s use of her
property.”46
Gerhart posits that property rights arise when individuals maintain
no duty to look out for the well-being of other individuals, and limitations on property rights manifest when an owner does have responsibilities to others.47 Under Gerhart’s duty principal, “an individual’s
obligations come from a decision the individual has made,” and these
duties “arise when an individual makes a decision from which it can
be reasonably inferred that the individual, if acting morally, would understand that the decision implies the obligation to take into account
the well-being of others when making future decisions.”48 In other
words, by making certain resource management decisions, owners accept that they owe obligations to others. This, of course, is obvious in
the case of a property owner who operates a coal smelter in a way that
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

GERHART, supra note 1, at 8.
Id. at 56.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 12.
GERHART, supra note 1, at 5.
Id.
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harms a neighbor’s property and is therefore a nuisance.49 As alluded
to in the previous section and discussed in greater detail later, however, once we recognize that there is one such circumstance where
obligations arise (nuisance, e.g.) then the question simply becomes
where to draw the line. This is arguably the most significant contribution of Gerhart’s work—that it advances notions of property owner
obligations beyond narrowly construed, longstanding legal precedents,
like common law nuisance. In this way, Gerhart provides a foundation for recognizing that it is not always the readily observable, easily
measurable damages from operating a coal smelter that give rise to
landowner obligations, but also aggregated small harms over time, the
damage of which may not be measurable except by future generations
and long after harm has already occurred. In this way, natural capital
appropriation on private land has the potential to be death by 1,000
cuts, or over 1,000 years, even if individual appropriations do not appear harmful enough to rise to the level of common law nuisance.
Indeed, “reasonableness” as a standard for adjudicating nuisance
claims suffers from an inherent constraint—it can only apply to what
is observable in the here and now, and does not take into account
temporally aggregated impacts of property development activities.
Natural capital appropriation more often gives rise to the latter problem, not the former. The reasonableness of property owners, therefore, should be judged by information gained through scientific
inquiry regarding the harm caused, for example, by forest and wetland
loss and associated habitat fragmentation, as well as by reference to
the drivers of those problems in the form of poor land use planning
leading to urban sprawl and other development maladies. Indeed, in a
point of departure from my general agreement with Gerhart’s positions, I would quibble with one of his assertions on this topic. Gerhart
states (in passing) that “[t]he obligation to be other regarding does not
. . . require that an individual deciding whether to use her property for
a cornfield or a cigar store take into account anyone else’s well-being.”50 But this overlooks the common-pool nature of resources and
that if everyone (or many people in areas with critical habitat) maintained a baseline legal right to use their property as a cornfield or a
cigar store there would be serious environmental consequences in the
aggregate. Think of Florida’s scrub ecosystem, replaced by orange
orchards, which have since been replaced by just these types of developments. It is not surprising that Florida is facing biodiversity, water
quality, and other crises. In this way, Gerhart’s other-regarding duty
may apply more broadly than even he originally conceived.
Regardless, since under Gerhart’s theory “each individual is
charged with responsibility to account for the interests of others in a
49. See McCarty v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 81 N.E. 549 (N.Y. 1907).
50. GERHART, supra note 1, at 115–16.
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morally appropriate way,”51 how would his theory hold individuals to
this standard? Gerhart answers that the rights individuals maintain
regarding the use of their property are subject to social recognition,
which in turn may constrain a property owner’s decisions regarding
that use.52 That constraint arises through political processes,53 which
of course may range from legislative action in the United States Congress, to state legislatures, to local zoning boards that reflect broader
community values than merely a handful of property owners’ interests. Constraint may also arise out of the common law as manifested
through judicial ruling (nuisance, for example).
Gerhart’s social recognition concept,
signifies that in a broad sense owners exercise their rights on behalf
of the community, performing a function that the community asks
of them (to make decisions about the resource), but subject to implicit obligations the community imposes as a condition for recognizing the rights. . . It implies that property regimes reflect an
overall social compact, and that owners are agents for the community, exercising powers given by the community under constraints
imposed by the community.54

Under this conception, the state is not separate from the community
whose moral understandings shape property rights’ role in managing
resources, but rather is “an institutionalized forum in which disputes
about property resources are resolved.”55 After all, “[i]nstitutions of
governance (such as courts and legislatures) are themselves socially
recognized” and “social recognition suggests that recognition of the
sovereign is recognition of the sovereign’s right to decide who makes
decisions about resources, as well as shared recognition that decisions
made by the sovereign are worthy of respect because of their
source.”56
Perhaps the most compelling example Gerhart provides of the social recognition concept in property is slavery. For a time in our country ownership of other persons as property was accepted by
government institutions; executive, legislative, and judicial. Shifting
societal views manifested in community beliefs that people as property was inappropriate.57 Over time, though prior acceptance by society “highly influenced state recognition of that form of property,”
institutions began to reflect social recognition, and “states began to
change the formal legal recognition that justified slavery.”58
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 13.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 50.
GERHART, supra note 1, at 80–81.
Id. at 81.
Id. at 79–80.
Id. at 101.
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So, having established that property owners are morally (and thus
legally) obligated to be other-regarding in their management of resources, and that social recognition manifesting in positive law (or the
courts) forms the basis for codifying that duty, how does society actually determine what to recognize as appropriate forms of property
ownership? In other words, how does society determine what appropriate obligations or duties should fall on property owners in their
management of resources? Gerhart argues that we should utilize the
veil of ignorance because it “provides a way of thinking about the
values that one ought to take into account when making decisions.”59
John Rawls veil of ignorance effectively challenges one to strive for
objectivity through bias reduction by asking: how would you want society to be governed if you had no idea whether you were rich or poor,
male or female, or black or white? In the property context, how
would you want resources to be managed by private property owners
if you were a non-owner, or a neighboring property owner, or a property owner elsewhere who merely valued a particular resource over
which you maintained control? This exercise helps us “determine
which party has an entitlement to be free from harm; that, of course, is
the question of what the law is.”60 In other words, the veil of ignorance is a useful “methodology for determining what assignment of
burdens and benefits can be called moral.”61 Gerhart uses the veil of
ignorance and moral obligation to challenge conventional notions of
resource ownership and management. Gerhart argues: “It would be
beneficial to change our conception of ownership. An alternative
meaning of ownership would connote some measure of control over,
and connection to, a resource. It would therefore create a bond between an individual and the resources subject to the individual’s decision making and control.”62
The following subsections detail how Gerhart’s notion of ownership
calls for change in conceptions of property rights in natural resources
and addresses a number of issues arising under privatized commons
resource theory. Specifically, these issues are: (1) the intersection of
social morality and natural resources; (2) spatial and temporal coordination of natural resource management; (3) the role of public law in
codifying private property owner duties regarding natural resource
management; and (4) the deficiencies in traditional law and economics
theory that are remedied by Gerhart’s property theory in tandem with
privatized commons resource theory.

59. Id. at 155.
60. GERHART, supra note 1, at 157.
61. Id. at 21 (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 13-22, 136–140 (Harvard
Univ. Press 1971)).
62. Id. at 312.
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Property Law, Social Morality and Natural Resources

There are many different categories of resources subject to property
ownership, but Gerhart often discusses natural resources when exploring appropriate other-regarding behavior of property owners. Gerhart references wetlands,63 waterways and air,64 endangered species,65
trees,66 and the broader ecological systems of which these resources
are a part67 as resources that require property owners to “adjust their
understanding of rights and obligations in order to reflect broader
community values . . . .”68
Indeed, the balance struck between private property rights and positive environmental law in the United States demonstrates the societal
tension regarding the question of “[w]ho ought to make decisions
about resources and how ought those decisions to be made?”69 Gerhart’s view is that a theory of property should not concern itself with
“what we get out of a resource,” but rather “what values a community
expects an individual to use in making decisions about resources.”70
The focus from this perspective is “on the values that people bring to
their relationships with others when making decision[s] about resources” rather than “on the relationship between individuals over
things they value.”71 Natural resources, after all, are not useful or important only to the property owner, but also to the broader society.
As Gerhart argues, “[t]he claim ‘I possess and therefore I own’ presupposes a community’s recognition that the claimed resource can be
privately owned; no claim to possession of waterways or air would
give the claimant a right to exclude others.”72 As discussed in the
prior Section, air and water are resources clearly seen by society as
not subject to strict proprietary rights. Yet, society depends heavily
on forests, biodiversity, wetlands, and other resources where notions
of strict proprietary rights do remain. While air and water are perhaps
more crucial to basic human survival over the short term, forests, biodiversity, wetlands, and other resources that may be anchored to
identifiable private properties rest along the same spectrum of resources crucial to both present society and future generations. In this
way, the relationship between a property owner and the rest of society
63. Id. at 36–37.
64. Id. at 78.
65. GERHART, supra note 1, at 72.
66. Id. at 298.
67. Id. at 297–98.
68. Id. at 36.
69. Id. at 5.
70. GERHART, supra note 1, at 7–8.
71. Id. at 9 (Gerhart notes that “if we look at property not as a resource to be
assigned but as society’s expression of social values that are important in making the
assignment, we begin to see the normative context of the notion of property—its ability to express values and its role as a device for mediating relationships between people,” Id. at 9).
72. Id. at 78.
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regarding how resources are used is more important than a property
owner’s individualized conception of how the resources on his or her
property ought to be used.
Of course, society might pay property owners for the use of natural
resources over which the property owner maintains control, and indeed this happens quite often in terms of extractive resources like timber, agricultural products, oil and gas, and so on. Society does not
take these resources and simply redistribute them, nor does society
force the extraction of those resources from private property against
the owner’s will. Property owners maintain incentives to cultivate
these resources because they can engage in a market—a market that
facilitates compensation from society to reward property owners for
their productive efforts.73 Yet sometimes the value society gains out
of landed resources is that they not be cultivated, commoditized, or
otherwise subject to market forces that encourage extraction and sale
(especially since such activities can actually lead to environmental
harm). In these instances, landowners could still be paid to preserve
these positive externalities, and markets are emerging that do just
that.74 But there are many social values that we require individuals to
recognize without any form of payment. For these social values we do
not pay society to provide a benefit as much as we obligate them to
refrain from harming others. Disallowing ownership of people as
property, for example, prevents a great number of undeniable harms.
Even so, prohibitions on slavery could also be characterized as the
provision of a benefit on society, since it supports equality among peoples, reduces wealth disparities, and leads to increased educational opportunities for all. Yet, we do not pay people not to own other
people. Future generations are as reliant (if not more reliant) on a
well-functioning environment as the current public. Therefore, society maintains a vested interest in responsible land management, and it
is unclear why property owners should be paid not to destroy resources on those lands. As Gerhart states,
society must determine, for any given distribution of resources, how
the rights and responsibilities of owners and non-owners, now and
in the future, ought to be distributed among individuals . . . given
the distribution of resources, what is the just or morally right way
for individuals to interact with other individuals over claims about
resources?75
73. Of course, sometimes property owners may have too few rights in resources,
which can lead to their destruction and mismanagement by centralized authorities.
Our strong property rights system, after all, facilitates a conservation fund’s ability to
purchase property and leave it in a natural state in perpetuity, for example.
74. Consider water quality trading, endangered species mitigation banks, conservation easements, etc. See Ecosystem Marketplace, http://www.ecosystemmarketplace
.com/.
75. GERHART, supra note 1, at 22.
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The goal for a community is to establish rights for property owners
constrained by property owner responsibilities to ensure that society
“gets the most out of its resources consistent with each individual’s
right to equal respect . . . .”?76 Thus, property owners become Gerhart’s “constrained decision-maker.” In other words, we want to allow the extraction of resources on private property, but when it
interferes with other property owner and non-owner rights—parties
who also rely on those resources due to their common-pool provision
of environmental services—then rights to engage in resource appropriation can be constrained.
If we accept that others and society without ownership rights maintain an interest in the natural capital on private land because of its
common-pool status, then Gerhart’s theory of property owner as constrained decision-maker becomes more than just a political concept,
but rather a legally defensible tenant of property law. A property
owner’s legal obligation to be other-regarding is crucial to representing society’s interest in the common-pool. Consider a world of one
property owner, but many citizens. It seems fairly uncontroversial
that this person would have a moral obligation not to destroy all the
natural resources over which she maintains control—perhaps by paving the world’s largest parking lot—not only because it would put her
well-being at risk but also the well-being of others in society. When
you disaggregate this single property owner’s moral duty into the
many property owner interests that exist in reality, we can see that all
property owners have a moral obligation not to destroy all natural
resources over which they maintain control—and when society’s assignment of that burden of property ownership manifests through positive law, individual property owners’ use of resources may be
constrained. Compare this with a view on the opposite end of the
spectrum, where property owners have a baseline right to appropriate
what they choose to appropriate, even if they owned it all and chose
to pave it all over. The moral obligation in this circumstance would be
on society to either compensate property owners for the natural capital that they hold hostage or otherwise suffer its destruction. Yet the
moral obligation can only flow in one direction here: property owners
have a moral obligation to society to manage natural resources in a
way that does not harm society, but society does not have a moral
obligation to pay for limitations on the rights of property owners to
destroy those natural resources. This thought experiment is made
concrete in Gerhart’s assertion that:
[e]ach individual . . . ought to take full responsibility for her decisions, while respecting the right of other individuals to express their
individuality and will by the decisions they make. Each individual
must act as he would if he made decisions that treated other individ76. Id. at 19.
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uals with equal freedom, allowing each individual to flourish in the
way each sees fit. . .giv[ing] content to the principle of equality by
relying on the veil of ignorance as a methodology for determining
what assignment of burdens and benefits can be called moral.77

John Rawls’s veil of ignorance, as noted earlier, asks us to consider
how we would want society to be governed if we had no way of knowing who we would be in society. Importantly, and as expounded upon
in the next Section, Rasband et al. have noted that the veil of ignorance applies temporally to resource management. In the temporal
context the question becomes: “How would you want resources managed today if you did not know when you would be born?”78 Clearly
individual property owners, each with the right to appropriate natural
capital unless paid by the government not to do so, are unable to argue that moral obligation running in that direction would ensure preservation of those resources in the future, not only for the public, but
also for individual property owners. This is especially important since
common-pool resources shared horizontally through space and across
private- and government-owned properties are also shared by resource users through time, as further discussed in the next Section.
B. Spatial and Temporal Commons and Future Generations
the spatial aspect of neighborliness also has temporal implications
. . . . Circumstances change, and with changed circumstances come
changing obligations . . . Decisions that are reasonable ex ante may
become unreasonable over time . . . .79

Ultimately, commons dilemmas arise out of an inability for resource
users to coordinate. While we tend to think primarily of commons
tragedies arising out of an inability to coordinate through space, it also
results from failure to coordinate through time. As a result, some sort
of aggregative process is needed to coordinate both spatial and temporal resource use decisions, whether it is private property, government policies, or voluntary contractual arrangements among users of a
common-pool.80 None of these potential solutions are silver bullets,
but private property in particular presents a unique set of challenges
in resolving commons dilemmas. Gerhart gets to the heart of privatized commons resource theory when he asks: “Ought we to envision
property theory to describe a process of aggregating individual interests into a social system, or ought we to understand social interests
(the “public good”) to be defined independently of individual interests. Is defining the social interest an aggregative process or an inde77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Rasband, supra note 8, at 20.
GERHART, supra note 1, at 196–97.
Hudson, supra note 15, at 1018.
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pendent process?”81 In the natural capital context an independent
process is warranted, because an aggregate of individual private property interests would likely be only aggregating individually rational,
collectively disastrous decisions.82 In this way, “the behavior of owners and non-owners that is appropriately other-regarding becomes the
device that coordinates resource use between individuals and allows
the law simultaneously to advance individual and social interests . . .
[by] act[ing] as the ideal, other-regarding decision maker would act.”83
Environmental legislation, in particular, Gerhart argues, came
about because the private law of property was unable to coordinate
user rights in a manner that would avoid the tragedy of the commons.84 Private property owners compete over resources and development activities that maximize the short-term value of their land,
and “when individuals compete, they effectively disregard (or even
intend) the negative impact of their decisions on the well-being of
others.”85 This, of course, is the opposite of coordination and cooperation, which individuals engage in “by taking into account the impact
of their decisions on others, hoping that the other will do the same.”86
Indeed, coordination is a basic foundation of common law property,
and is why law emerged to avoid the negative consequences of property owner competition (the first and foremost being violence) and to
facilitate cooperation (from nuisance law to zoning and other regulatory tools aimed at balancing property owner interests). Yet, even
though “our system of private property assumes that decentralized
and individual decisions about resources, when coordinated through
well-functioning markets, lead to the appropriate outcome for the
community,”87 competition for resource appropriations leaves resources in a tragic plight unless resource users voluntarily curb their
rationality or government policy accounts for it. Gerhart states,
The implementation of common belief systems requires that individuals adopt other-regarding decision making, refraining from selfregarding decisions (overexploitation) when their self-interest suggests that a sacrifice of their short-run self-regarding interests will,
in cooperation with others, achieve their long-run interests. In this
context, individuals are other-regarding when they curtail their use
of the commons in order to coordinate with other users to preserve
the stock of resources and ensure the long-run health of the
commons.88
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

GERHART, supra note 1, at 15.
HUDSON, supra note 5.
GERHART, supra note 1, at 15.
See id. at 218–19.
Id. at 67.
Id.
Id. at 283–84.
GERHART, supra note 1, at 220.
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Consider coordination problems through space—that is, how specific resources are managed by current resource users. Gerhart highlights that the owners of subsurface common pool resources like oil,
gas, and water share resources uniquely since one owner’s use of the
resource necessarily affects others’ use of the resource.89 Gerhart argues that coordination problems arise for subsurface resources
because,
the decisions of surface owners . . . are so interdependent that it is
not possible for society to rely on independent but coordinated decisions. Each surface owner’s decisions about where and how to
extract resources has a potentially immediate and direct impact on
the well-being of other surface owners and on their ability to extract
wealth from the common pool. Like co-users of common property,
each surface owner has an interest in the pool that cannot be easily
separated from the interest of other surface owners.90

Yet the same is true for categories of above-surface natural capital
that are historically seen as more readily subject to private property
rights, like forests, species habitat, or wetlands. While Gerhart criticizes the use of an unchecked private property paradigm for the management of oil, gas, and water, this criticism could apply equally to
common pool natural capital at the surface. One private property
owner’s use of forests, for example, does not necessarily reduce forest
resources on another’s land, but does harm the broader public when a
number of similar private appropriations are aggregated. In short,
spatial coordination problems across private properties are commons
problems.
Spatial commons problems are only exacerbated by temporal coordination problems. Gerhart argues that sequential owners are “common owners (over time rather than during a period of time), and it
would not surprise us that common owners have obligations to one
another that are forged from their recognition of their common ownership.”91 Gerhart delves into specific examples of temporal coordination problems by focusing on very tangible, well-established
property concepts like the doctrines of waste, destruction, and restraints on alienation under trusts and estate law. Each of these doctrines is aimed at resolving potential conflicts between present and
future owners. The doctrine of waste, for example, stands for the proposition that a current owner owes duties to future owners “by virtue
of their sequential relationship,” which “requires each owner/possessor who gets the present benefits of the property to also accept the
burdens of saving appropriate benefits for future owners.”92
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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at
at
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222.
223.
232–33.
59.
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Gerhart’s approach to temporal coordination may be characterized
as conservative in that he does not stray too far from legal doctrines
that, while aimed at temporal considerations, insist on identifiable successors in interest who would be affected by resource decisions. Yet
the tenor of his arguments regarding each are no less tangible when
weighing obligations that arise regarding the appropriation of natural
capital and the ability of legislatures to restrict that appropriation
when it would be in the best interests of unidentifiable (in a legal
sense) future generations. In other words, in the context of the doctrine of waste, destruction, or restraints on alienation, Gerhart is obviously talking about specific property arrangements involving
identifiable parties, rather than temporal considerations writ large.
Yet, the role of public law in reigning in the development of property
today so that resources can be available for future generations is often
overlooked when deciding what burdens a property owner should
bear. In this way, as with the doctrines of waste, destruction, or restraints on alienation, “the appropriate division of decision-making responsibility over time occurs when a present owner is required to take
into account the well-being of future owners . . . .”93
Consider the doctrine of destruction. Historically an owner had a
right to destroy her property. Yet, the law is increasingly limiting this
right, “and the many instances in which legislative regulation intervenes to require preservation [ ] recognize[s] those instances in which
the owner of property does not bear the relevant social costs of destruction.”94 This is the justification for cultural or historical preservation, for example, or laws against the dumping of hazardous waste and
the preservation of habitat.95 Though destruction of property as a legal doctrine deals with a property right outside the core of the property rights bundle, it is nonetheless on the spectrum of property rights
that facilitate the removal of resources of value to society at large.
Why should we be moving towards a concept of property whereby a
government can disallow a property owner from tearing down (under
the doctrine of destruction) a perfectly good, albeit historical, house if
she wishes, but not disallow her from paving her 100 acres of (entirely) coastal wetlands out of concern that it will owe just compensation? In many ways the latter resources may be of more importance
to society than historical structures.
Other fundamental property doctrines, even those dealing primarily
with spatial coordination, tell us something about the temporal nature
of managing resources and private law’s inadequacies in doing so.
Gerhart discusses trespass as being a prime example whereby owners
generally have a stringently protected right to exclude, but the right is
limited in circumstances where property owners “sometimes have ob93. Id. at 227.
94. Id. at 237.
95. Id.
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ligations to be appropriately other-regarding concerning the well-being of potential users of property . . . .”96 This is the case, as in State v.
Shack, for medical workers gaining access to a farm to help migrant
workers.97 Might the underlying logic also be applicable in the context of appropriate limits on the ability of current property owners to
exclude future owners from accessing resources on the property, if
those resources are deemed essential enough for society to protect
through positive law?
Clearly, waste, destruction, restraints on alienation, and trespass are
legal doctrines based upon property relationships and contractual arrangements between identifiable parties, which is of course different
conceptually from general duties of resource management owed to
speculative future property owners. Yet, the latter lies along the spectrum of just the type of social obligation at which doctrines like waste
and destruction are aimed. After all, regarding these doctrines “the
law asks which individual can avoid the harm at least cost.”98 Future
generations have no ability to avoid costs associated with how resources are managed today; current property owners do.
Given that spatial and temporal natural capital commons remain
even in the presence of private property, and archaic private law principles are inadequate to address their management, how might public
law step in based upon Gerhart’s theory? Gerhart, after all, posits
that “moral rights, perhaps because they are given so little respect in
the United States, are rarely discussed with other issues of temporal
coordination.”99 Even so, since the purpose of the law is to allocate
decision-making responsibility for resources through time, Gerhart argues that property theory should address “the relationship between
sequential owners that understands the role of the market in protecting owner autonomy over time and that situates the role of the law in
intervening when the market cannot play its coordinating role.”100 In
doing so, Gerhart discusses the many ways in which private law is “inadequate to successfully coordinate decisions over time, which provides a justification for legislative intervention as a response to the
deficiencies of private law and the market.”101
Conventional property theory maintains that a property owner has
no general obligations to future owners if there is no identifiable future owner who would have standing at private law to enforce a right
against a present owner.102 Gerhart posits that it is unclear why an
owner should not be accountable to even unidentified future owners
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
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for the damage the owner does to their potential property interests,
and “we rarely ask why the owner is given dominion to do acts that
damage the future value of the property.”103 Gerhart argues that
viewing the market as serving as an adequate proxy for the interests of
future owners perhaps clouds our judgment here. Indeed, the market
can actually increase value short term from development activities,
while decreasing it even further in the future because of an aggregated
loss of natural capital. Gerhart acknowledges that the market provides some management benefits, but it also presents major weaknesses—primarily that information and externality problems arise.
The law intercedes to “police those requirements.”104Citing Judge
Posner in the context of the waste doctrine, “the goal of legal intervention is to maximize the long-run value of property . . . .”105 As
detailed further in the next Section, without positive law, the long-run
value of much property in the United States is lessened. Therefore, a
theory of market failure justifies intervention of positive law when
“the market is unable to fulfill its function as a stand-in for future
owners because an owner can escape the consequences of her
decisions.”106
The difficulty in analyzing present owner decisions versus future
generation interests, of course, is that future owners may very well
prefer developed property over natural capital.107 As Gerhart notes
in the context of waste, “one owner likes income from timber and the
next owner likes forests.”108 But it is not only future owners of specific parcels of property that must be treated in an “other-regarding”
manner by present owners. Society at large, including other private
property owners in the region, would also be harmed from aggregated
impacts of natural capital appropriation. Gerhart acknowledges that
the solution to this problem is recognizing that:
decision making is interdependent, which implies that each owner
ought to take into account the well-being of subsequent owners . . .
[a] decision about the use of the property becomes unreasonable if,
given the state of knowledge that a reasonable owner ought to have,
the owner fails to consider appropriately the well-being of subsequent owners.109

In modern times, any reasonably situated property owner maintains
access to scientifically-based information about the dangers of unchecked, aggregated natural capital appropriation. Positive law be103. Id.
104. Id. at 232.
105. GERHART, supra note 1, at 234.
106. Id. at 232.
107. Though certainly there are gradations of policy options in between all out
preservation and all out development, such as developments that better integrate and
preserve natural capital within them.
108. GERHART, supra note 1, at 235.
109. Id. at 235.
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comes essential to manifest the interests of future generations in
curbing that appropriation, because as Gerhart notes:
Individuals care about how land use decisions affect other individuals and the community of individuals, both present and future; they
care about the future of their environment and the sustainability of
the ecological system. Without legislative regulation, those interests
would not be accounted for by the legal system . . . wetlands preservation laws, for example, involve a conflict between present and future generations and an intra-generational conflict between those
who find preservation to be worthwhile and those who do not. Because trees, endangered species, and future generations do not have
standing, those with an interest in trees, endangered species, and
future generations can use the legislative outlet to express their interests. The resolution of disputes over these kinds of interests requires consideration of both the harm to the owners and the
benefits to a widely diffuse and heterogeneous population (over
time) and are best dealt with in the aggregation process that only
legislative regulation can provide.110

The next Section discusses the role of public law in addressing the
spatial and temporal coordination problems created by the management of privatized commons resources.
C.

The Role of Public Law

[P]roperty rights arise, and are worthy of moral respect, because
they follow terms under which the community recognizes claims
over resources.111

Gerhart’s theory of property law provides a framework for the argument that private property owners maintain a legal obligation, as
represented by society’s values, to manage natural capital in a way
that is other-regarding toward the public. Under Gerhart’s concept of
duty the community must give form to the other-regarding decisions
private property owners must make regarding the management of resources over which they maintain control.112 Contrary to Gerhart’s
theory, other theories of property seem to presume private property
owners have a recognized legal right to appropriate natural capital
virtually at will, even to the point that if owners do not engage in
resource consumption their property right might be revoked. The labor theory of property, for example, supports ownership rights for
those who cultivate land (recall homesteading acts) and even justifies
taking away a property interest if an owner does not utilize resources
(such as prior appropriation property regimes for water in the west or
adverse possession laws).
110. Id. at 297–98.
111. Id. at 48.
112. Id. at 54.
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There are many positive laws that seek to constrain property owners and arguably call upon property owners’ legal obligations per Gerhart’s theory, as is the case with the federal Endangered Species Act
and other statutes. These laws, however, face an uphill battle against
many property owners’ and commentators’ view that the baseline
right is one of appropriation unconstrained by duty and therefore the
presence of constraints requires compensation. In other words, positive public law that would otherwise constrain private property owners from behaving with a rational, commons herder mentality and
thereby enforce their moral duty to manage natural capital in an
“other-regarding” way toward the public may be hindered by constitutional interpretation—and primarily interpretations of the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause.
Let us step back for a moment and recall that the genesis for public
controls on natural resource management was predominantly private
law. The types of conflicts that gave rise to nuisance claims adjudicated through the court system, for example, later became preemptively addressed through zoning law. Zoning law, in turn, was shaped
by the body of decisions adjudicating private nuisances. Private law
was the first form of constraint on private landowner activity when
appropriating resources. Gerhart describes nuisance law as allowing
owners to make decisions about the use of their property, but these
decisions “are constrained by the obligation of each owner to think
reasonably about how his or her decisions might affect other owners
(private nuisance) and non-owners (public nuisance).”113 Stated differently, “the law’s function in nuisance cases is to assess the decisions
made by each neighbor in light of what each neighbor should have
understood about the decisions (past, present, and future) of other
neighbors (assuming that the other neighbors will make reasonable
decisions).”114
Gerhart notes, however, that private law was insufficient to address
a number of resource management issues. Gerhart argues that a
plaintiff can claim that “he should not have been denied access to the
defendant’s property, or that the defendant should not be emitting
dangerous smoke from her factory, but the plaintiff may not claim
that the defendant’s decision to kill endangered species or fill in valuable wetlands was a wrong as to him.”115 As a result, Gerhart says the
role of public law is to protect a “broader range of interests that the
owner must take into account—interests of the community that are
not, by themselves, the source of an individual wrong.”116 Indeed,
public law is a manifestation of collective interests that correspond
with society’s interest in privatized commons resources, whereas nui113.
114.
115.
116.
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sance reflects an ad hoc resolution of individual conflicts over isolated
and segmented resource units of natural capital. Ultimately, one of
public law’s functions is to allow the government “to mediate between
the private interest and the interests of the community as a whole in
ways that private law cannot mediate, so that owners, when they make
decisions, take a wider range of values into account, including values
that are held collectively rather than individually.”117
Public law is also superior to private law in many cases because it is
proactive (zoning) whereas private law is reactive (nuisance).118
Proactivity can avoid environmental problems that would otherwise
be costly to ameliorate after the fact. Land use law and zoning, in
particular, “allow[ ] the legislature to make sure that each owner’s decisions take into account a broader range of factors and appropriately
reflect social interests that private law cannot address.”119 Not only is
legislation meant to represent a broader range of interests, but it also
represents interests over “a wider time horizon, to account for a community’s heterogeneity of interests.”120 This is how the legislature
through positive law (such as land use regulation) “arrang[es] the
rights and responsibilities of owners and non-owners with respect to
resources.”121
The authority of the legislature to engage in these activities arises
from the police power, (protection of the public health, safety and
welfare), while the Takings Clause is the limitation on such authority
(in addition to a variety of due process considerations regarding land
use and related procedures based upon the Equal Protection Clause
and Due Process Clause).122 Gerhart states that both the police
power and the Takings Clause “reflect the social recognition concept
by giving the legislature the authority to rearrange the terms of the
preexisting arrangement of property rights and responsibilities, changing owners, or expanding or contracting the rights and responsibilities
of owners and non-owners established through private law and private
arrangements.”123 In this way, Gerhart’s social recognition concept
does not see property rights emanating from or recognized by the government as if the government were a separate entity. Rather, the government is a manifestation of the community and its norms,124 and
“[w]hen courts and legislatures determine the rights and responsibilities of individuals over resources, they take part in an interactive social conversation about how decisions over resources ought to be
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
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made.”125 These conversations often involve, of course, the provision
of public goods like environmental preservation.126 In this way:
the community, acting through its political processes, makes claims
on owners to adjust the rights and obligation in order to take into
account the values that are not appropriately accounted for in private law settings. Here community values . . . preservation of a wetland, for example . . . influence the shape of property law by
aggregating the burdens and benefits of ownership through the legislative process.127

To summarize, Gerhart theorizes that public law is superior to private law in the management of many resources and that public law is
the manifestation of society’s allocation of the burdens of property
ownership and of the moral duty of property owners to be other-regarding. If so, then what is the primary roadblock to the utilization of
public law to protect society’s interest in natural capital resources? It
ultimately comes down to the conflation of a property owner’s right to
use property with their right to exclude others from property. Due to
this conflation there are circumstances under which governments have
been unable to legislate for the protection of resources because it resulted in the finding of a “taking” under the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution (and the government either could not afford or was unwilling to provide such compensation).128 And yet,
these regulations merely restricted use, not a property owner’s right to
exclude. As Gerhart argues, “[t]here is a fundamental difference between government action that impairs the right to exclude (which eminent domain protects) and government action that impairs the right to
use property . . . .”129 The doctrine of regulatory takings, Gerhart
argues, “wrongfully equates the government’s obligation to compensate owners for nullifying the right to exclude with limitations on state
regulation of the right to use property.”130 Gerhart is critical of the
unintelligible principals which undergird the regulatory takings doctrine, and argues that even restrictions on land use that severely reduce the value of property are not takings requiring just compensation
as long as they do not interfere with the right to exclude.131
While scholars and judges often assert that regulation goes “too far”
when it becomes the functional equivalent of a physical invasion, this
analysis is unhelpful in determining whether a taking has actually occurred or not.132 Gerhart argues that it is not some amorphous functional physical invasion that results in a taking, but rather the
125.
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restriction on the right to exclude,133 and that “the oft-repeated statements that regulating land use can be the functional equivalent of a
taking are simply wrong.”134
The primary flaw in the regulatory takings doctrine according to
Gerhart is that it “suggests that the state’s role is to relieve owners of
some of their burdens of ownership rather than to identify the burdens that are appropriately imposed to deliver public goods.”135 Most
often, private landowner choices or natural forces are to blame for the
circumstances that make regulation of resource appropriation activities necessary,136 and as a result, “[g]overnment ought not be required
by the Constitution to act as a guarantor against such losses.”137 Gerhart posits that property ownership places the burden on owners to
adjust to changing circumstances that affect value, “including changing social perceptions about the value of resources in various contexts.”138 Owners are particularly suited to bear this burden since
investment-backed expectations include an understanding that property may be subject to future regulation.
Gerhart’s theory of moral obligation mediates a “muddled” regulatory takings doctrine,139 about which Gerhart forcefully declares:
“never have so many able minds tried so hard, with so little success, to
provide content to an idea that, when properly understood, is vacuous.”140 Even in the extreme (though undoubtedly rare) circumstance
whereby a property owner is completely prohibited from appropriating any natural capital on his property,141 positive public law represents the values society places on those resources and evinces a
manifestation of the moral right the public maintains in the services
provided by them. The countervailing moral duty a property owner
has to protect those resources, in turn, extends to both the present and
future public’s interest in maintaining a healthy environment across
133. Id.
134. Id. at 265.
135. GERHART, supra note 1, at 267.
136. See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277 (1928); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003, 1024 (1992).
137. GERHART, supra note 1, at 269.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 268; see also id. at 13 (“[M]oreover, if the only constraint on state regulation is to say that it cannot “go too far,” what baseline are we measuring the deviation
when determining how far the regulation has gone? The theory in this book develops
a concept of property that understands the Constitution to both authorize and limit
state regulation of property on the basis of a core concept of property, a concept that
allows us to chart the border between state power and its limitations. . .[I] suggest an
approach to property law that unifies ideas concerning the disparate interests of owners and non-owners into a framework that shows how each individual is charged with
responsibility to account for the interests of others in a morally appropriate
way. . .each person in a property relationship must make context-appropriate decisions that are grounded on values that are themselves morally justified.”).
140. Id. at 259.
141. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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the aggregated private properties within governmental jurisdictions.
Property owners still, after all, maintain many other sticks in the bundle of rights, including the right to exclude, the right to transfer, and
even the right to use the property, though not in a way that requires
complete appropriation of the natural capital. Indeed, “use restrictions impair the marketability of the property for the forbidden uses,
but that does not keep the market from performing its coordination
function; the market continues to coordinate uses among owners for
the non-forbidden uses.”142 As a result, legislatures regulate land use
not because “markets are unable to perform their coordinating function; it is that individual owners do not account for all the information
that is relevant to the social value of the property.”143 Gerhart’s book
makes this understanding of rights and obligations explicit in his theorization of the relationship between private property owner and the
government as representative of the public interest. In this way, government regulation becomes the mechanism for coordinating what
might otherwise be rational, self-regarding behavior on the part of private property owners appropriating natural resources from the “commons” that is the environment. As the next section demonstrates,
traditional law and economics analysis does not account for the interconnectedness of individual private properties in constituting the ecosystems making up the “environment,” and therefore ignores the
“other-regarding” duty of private property owners to manage resources in a way that does not cause harm to society in the aggregate.
D. Deficiencies in Traditional Law and Economic Analysis
Viewing ownership as control and connection rather than the right
to market gains and losses shifts our focus from property as the
holder of value to property as the reflection of things individuals
value.144

The growth of law and economics analysis in recent decades provides an important lens through which to understand resource management. But law and economics is, after all, only a lens. While
traditional law and economics analysis helps us overcome conventional policy wisdom through the cultivation of more rigorous empirical data on a wide range of issues, it remains only one tool for
understanding resource management issues. And it does not have all
the answers.
Gerhart distinguishes his theory from law and economics analysis,
even though the latter also “understand[s] property law to function to
maximize individual well-being.”145 But unlike traditional economic
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analysis, Gerhart’s theory “does not assume that the maximizing process is either value-free or self-defining. Instead, the theory faces directly, as many economic theories do not, the question of whose wellbeing matters and how we determine whose well-being must be sacrificed so that another’s well-being may increase.”146
More pointedly, Gerhart argues that:
the economic view cannot prevail because the methods of valuation
that economists have suggested are morally deficient, a point made
by many. Valuing two people’s well-being on the basis of revealed
preferences, or by imagining hypothetical preferences that would
prevail if wealth were equally distributed, misses the point that interpersonal comparisons ought to be made using social values developed through social interaction, not personal valuations . . . What
matters is the values people ought to use to shape their decisions,
not how much they would pay to avoid the cost in question.147

While corrective justice theories “imply[ ] that wealth maximization
does not mean maximizing each individual’s self-regarding interest,”148 law and economics utilizes self-regarding interest to create “a
goal-oriented view of law” where welfare maximization is the law’s
goal.149 Maximizing each individual’s self-regarding interest, in turn,
becomes the foundation for a view that a property owner has a virtually unrestricted right to appropriate natural capital. It follows under
this view that prohibitions on appropriation should be compensated
by society through the government.
As indicated earlier, privatized commons resource theory may be
subject to criticism under traditional law and economics analysis,
which conceives of a legal right to exclude others not only from one’s
property but, more importantly, from decisions regarding the appropriation (or consumption) of natural capital on one’s property. If society has no rights that it can enforce against a property owner, law
and economics analysis would say that natural resources on private
property are no longer in a commons condition. To the contrary, law
and economics conceives of traditional common-pool resources as creating management problems because each herder is being harmed by
another who has no legal rights or obligations. With no one having
legal rights or obligations, no one herder can leverage invested assets
to avoid tragedy. These analysts would argue that private property
owners, on the other hand, do have rights in resources that they can
exercise and leverage however they wish, for good or ill—the right to
destroy resources or the right to protect them. Law and economics
critics might argue that property owner A has a legal right to appropriate natural capital and if other private property owners want to
146.
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prevent said appropriation they can leverage their own rights to avoid
“tragedy,” perhaps through negotiating with property owner A an
amount of compensation that would make it worthwhile for owner A
to leave the natural capital in place. This criticism assumes, however,
that property owner A has a baseline property right of appropriation,
unconstrained by obligation or duty. Therefore, property owner A is
under no legal duty to appropriate natural capital in a way that avoids
causing harm to the public, or perhaps not to appropriate natural capital at all because it will harm the public’s rights in those resources.
Under a privatized commons resource conception of natural resources within Gerhart’s theoretical framework of property, however,
the moral obligation of a would be appropriator of natural capital is
brought to bear by the leveraging of the moral rights of other property
owners and non-owners to have those resources managed sustainably,
even though other property owners have no property right in the land
itself. In this way, the moral obligation for the management of natural
capital runs one direction, such that regulation reflecting society’s values and interests in natural resources can create more stringent restrictions on natural capital use (as long as not running afoul of
confiscating the actual land); but it cannot undo a property owner’s
right to protect natural capital more stringently than would the government or other property owners.
As a private property owner, I may not have a right to walk on a
neighbor’s land, camp on it, or take it from her. But I do have a morally justified right in the carbon sequestration values of the trees on
her property; the riparian buffer zone water quality protections provided by those trees; the biodiversity protection the habitat on her
property provides, for wildlife that may very well come onto my property; the cancer medicine that may be derived from species on her
property and used to treat my current family or descendants; and the
flood retention value provided by wetlands on her property. The
moral rights I have in those resources and services give rise, in turn, to
moral obligations on her part not to consume those resources in a way
that harms me, other property owners, and future generations of
rights holders who will depend on the values and services generated
by that natural capital. It may very well be that while her individual
appropriation of such resources, even if permanent, would have little
effect in isolation—which, unlike nuisance law, renders the moral violation hardly noticeable—the aggregated effect of all private property
owners doing the same would cause harm to society at large, now and
in the future. In this way the situation is no different than Hardin’s
herders, and legal obligations driven by moral imperative give a government the right to restrict those property rights without compensation—as long as it does not overstep and limit ownership, occupation,
or other clearly sacred indicia of property rights.
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While labeling natural resources on private land commons resources may be novel and may fly in the face of traditional law and
economics principles, the sentiment underpinning that notion is not.
The public and wildlife trust doctrines, for example, recognize the
public’s interest in certain resources that cannot be subject to forms of
privatization that harm the public’s interest in those resources. And
yet, battles over the scope of the doctrines indicate that they may not
take the theory underpinning them far enough (are the doctrines limited to submerged lands under navigable waters and wildlife? If not,
what reasonable checks can be placed on their use?150). Indeed, other
common law constraints on private property rights are often aimed at
remedying economic harms or maximizing economic efficiency. Such
is the case with nuisance law, which may be used to protect environmental resources, but often focuses on economic or health impacts.
These common law principles, in turn, are often codified by positive
law—nuisance law in the form of zoning, for example, which often
seeks to protect economic resources by placing industry away from
residential property so as not to reduce its value or threaten it with
fire, though zoning may also be used to protect environmental values.
General positive law-making authority at the state level is a manifestation of the police power, and at the federal level a manifestation
of the Commerce Clause power. Whether common law arising out of
public trust or police power principles (nuisance) or positive legislation at the local, state, or federal levels, governments have historically
been tasked with balancing the public’s interest in common-pool natural resources spread across private and public properties. A traditional law and economics critique that denies property owner
obligations regarding the management of those resources, and simultaneously places a duty on the part of the public to compensate for
constraints on that management, flies in the face of many long-standing legal doctrines.
IV.

CONCLUSION

While Gerhart’s book will no doubt be a source of rigorous debate
in some quarters of property theory, I am hopeful that my review
demonstrates an application of his theory in practice. I believe his
book will have an immediate impact not only on property law, but on
the related fields of land use regulation and environmental and natural resources law and policy. Gerhart’s work takes privatized commons resource theory beyond a normative claim for policy-making or
a tool for ad hoc jurisprudence in courts and places the concept within
a holistic theory of property, which sheds light on how disputes over
the regulation of natural capital on private land should be resolved.
150. See Blake Hudson, The American Takings Revolution and Public Trust Preservation: A Tale of Two Blackstones, 5 SEA GRANT L. AND POL’Y J. 57 (2013).
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Although property owners maintain a legal right to exclude others
from their land, they maintain a legal, morally based obligation regarding the natural capital on that property—an obligation, which extends to the present and future public’s interest in maintaining a
healthy environment across the aggregated private properties within
governmental jurisdictions. This obligation, therefore, removes any
legal right a property owner maintains to require just compensation
for government regulation when appropriation of that natural capital
would harm the public at large (even if that harm is the result of seemingly small harms aggregated over time). Gerhart’s book makes this
understanding of rights and obligations explicit in his theorization of
the relationship between a private property owner and the government as representative of the public interest.
Ultimately, Gerhart’s theory in combination with privatized commons resource theory makes clear that when private property owners
maintain obligations to look out for the well-being of other individuals
in their management of natural capital, limitations on their property
rights in natural capital are validated by the property rights regime,
rather than being undermined by it—as would be the case if just compensation were required for such limitations. It is true that “[t]he law
imposes no freestanding obligation to benefit fellow citizens.”151 Yet,
that is different from a freestanding duty not to harm broader society.
Gerhart expresses this sentiment best:
[W]hen an individual is attached in an appropriate way to the risk of
loss another faces, the individual must, when making choices, give
appropriate significance to the harm another might incur. This is
because it is the individual’s own choice that leads the individual to
be attached to the risk of harm another might face, and the other is
entitled to be free from the avoidable consequences of that
choice.152

The resources shared across private properties are common-pool, a
fact that is scientifically undeniable even if legally unrecognized at
present. Positive environmental law allows society to better attach the
risk of loss property owners face with the harm that society might incur when private property owners manage (or mismanage) resources.
Without such constraints, we risk validating property regimes that put
society’s long-term well-being at risk, rather than ones that facilitate
that well-being. Destruction of common pool natural capital crucial to
societal well-being is an avoidable consequence, and property owners
are best situated to avoid that consequence. Other property owners
and the public at large should be free from those consequences to the
greatest degree possible.
151. GERHART, supra note 1, at 116.
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